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Article: 
The meteoric rise in cybercrime has been an issue of pressing concern to our society. According to Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), nine out of 10 U.S. companies experienced computer security incidents in 2005 
which led to a loss of $67.2 billion. A survey conducted by IBM found that U.S. businesses worry more about 
cybercrimes than about physical crimes. Internet-related frauds accounted for 46% of consumer complaints 
made to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2005. Total losses of Internet fraud victims reporting to FTC 
increased from $205 million in 2003 to $336 million in 2005. In a July 2007 interview with USA Today, 
McAfee CEO reported that his company received 3,000-5,000 threat submissions per day from customers and 
10% of them were new. 
 
This paper offers an economic analysis to explain cybercrimes‘ escalation. We define cybercrimes as criminal 
activities in which computers or computer networks are the principal means of committing an offense. 
Examples include cyber-theft, cyber-trespass, cyberobscenity, critical infrastructure attacks and cyber-
extortions.
6
 The most notable features of the cybercrime environment include newness, technology and skill-
intensiveness, and a high degree of globalization. Factors such as a wide online availability of hacking tools, in-
formation sharing in the cyber-criminal community, availability of experienced hackers‘ help to less skillful 
criminals and congestion in law enforcement systems produce externality effects within the cybercriminal 
community as well as across society and businesses. 
 
We focus on three positive or self-reinforcing feedback systems to examine increasing returns in cybercrime 
related activities. In this article, we first provide an overview of the positive feedback loops that reinforce 
cybercriminals‘ behavior. Then, we describe mechanisms associated with externality in cybercrime related 
activities. 
 
Increasing Returns and Feedback Loops in Cybercrimes 
Increasing returns approach help explain how firms, innovations, industries, and the environment influence each 
other. The law of increasing returns argues that economies of scale, decreasing costs and feedback mechanisms 
lead to a further success of already successful entities. W.B. Arthur
1
 notes: ―Increasing returns are... mech-
anisms of positive feedback that operate—within markets, businesses, and industries—to reinforce that which 
gains success or aggravate that which suffers loss.‖ This article explores evidence of increasing returns in 
cybercrime activities. 
 
There are three types of self-reinforcing feedback systems: economic, sociopolitical and cognitive.
1,7
 Cyber-
crimes‘ significant financial benefits provide a positive economic feedback to cyber-criminals. An IDG News 
Service article (May 28 2004) quoted a Russian hacker: ―There is more of a financial incentive now for hackers 
and crackers as well as for virus writers to write for money and not just for glory or some political motive.‖ A 
low probability of cyber-criminals‘ being caught and prosecuted
6
 and less severity of punishment give them a 
high positive economic feedback .
3
 
Sociopolitical feedbacks are related to formal and informal institutions.
8,12
 Social feedbacks are linked to 
informal institutions such as sanctions applied by a social group to exclude a cybercriminal from one‘s circle of 
friends. Political feedbacks, on the other hand, are applied by regulative institutions. 
 
Cognitive feedback loops are associated with cognitive programs that are built on mental maps of individual 
hackers. Put differently, cognitive systems influence the lens through which existing and potential criminals 
view cybercrimes.
12
 Effects such as enjoyment from and less guilt in cybercrimes serve as cognitive feedbacks. 
 
Mechanisms Associated with Externality in Cybercrimes 
Given the cybercrime environment and feedback loops, increasing returns could manifest themselves in many 
ways. For instance, cyber-criminals may ‗invent‘ sophisticated and new tools that law enforcement agencies 
face increased difficulty in tracing. Cyber-criminals could also operate from countries with weak cybercrime 
laws. 
 
We examine three mechanisms that may give positive feedback to cybercriminals: inefficiency and congestion 
in the law enforcement system, acceleration of the diffusion of cybercrime know-how and technology and 
increase in potential criminals‘ predisposition toward cybercrimes.
5,11 
From victims‘ perspective, there is 
arguably a vicious circle of cybercrimes linking characteristics of cyber-criminals, cybercrime victims, and law 
enforcement agencies
6
 and a corresponding virtuous circle for cyber-criminals. These externality mechanisms 
strengthen the elements of the vicious circle for victims and of the virtuous circle for criminals. 
 
Table 1 presents how the externality mechanisms and the feedback systems described here are intertwined. 
 
Ineffciency and Congestion in the Law Enforcement System  
Congestion and inefficiency in law enforcement systems arise from factors such as newness of cybercrimes, a 
low governmental priority, a lack of cross-border, and industry-government cooperation and victims‘ 
unwillingness to report.
6
 In the U.S., attempts to regulate cyberspace to protect children faced oppositions from 
groups which argue that such measures undermine free speech. Some countries are also slow to enact 
cybercrime laws. 
 
Law enforcement agencies such as police forces and the FBI are inexperienced with cybercrimes. Cyber-
criminals and victims tend to be scattered across the country and the world, posing logistical challenges. At the 
same time, while large law enforcement agencies such as FBI have developed some capacity to deal with 
cybercrimes, localized police forces aren‘t equipped to deal with national and global nature of cybercrimes. 
They are also facing manpower shortages. According to a Washington Post article (May 17, 2000), only 2% of 
U.S. police personnel were trained in cyber-forensics. 
 
Law enforcement agencies lack sufficient resources to fight cybercrimes. For instance, in 2005, FBI spent $150 
million on cybercrimes out of its $5 billion budget. Similarly, the U.K.‘s National Hi-Tech Crime Unit could 
not convince cybercrimes‘ seriousness to the government and secured only half the funds needed. A Business 
Week article notes: ―Cops don‘t have all the weapons they need to fight back. They clearly lack the financial 
resources to match their adversaries‘ technical skills and global reach‖ (May 30, 2005). 
 
Beyond all that, conventional crimes have diverted law enforcement agencies‘ attention away from 
cybercrimes. For instance, at a U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs meeting in May 2007, 
leaders of national law enforcement organizations noted that budgetary cuts to programs such as the 
Community Oriented Policing Service (COPS) have led to escalation in violent crimes and ―adversely affected 
local crime prevention and local law enforcement initiatives.‖ 
 
In poorer nations, fighting cybercrime gets a lower priority. In Indonesia, the police say they lack expertise and 
resources to fight against cybercrimes. The country‘s Information Technology Sub-Directorate of the 
Directorate of Special Crimes of the National Police Headquarters had only one dial-up connection in 2002. 
Moreover, Indonesian police use a ‗red book,‘ a manual to conduct credit card investigations, to handle Internet 
credit card frauds. Estimates suggest that only 15% of reported incidents are investigated in Indonesia. 
 
Cybercrimes are increasingly sophisticated and new forms and methods are developing rapidly. Law 
enforcement agencies have failed to catch up with the constant progressive nature of such crimes. 
 
A further congestion in the law enforcement system is caused by unavailability of cyber-criminals‘ database. 
Most of the new breed of criminals‘ profile differs from conventional criminals.‘ In Russia, for instance, most 
hackers are young, educated, and work independently and thus do not fit conventional criminal profiles. 
 
Digital criminals are also more difficult to catch and prosecute than conventional ones. In fact, collection and 
retention of evidence has been a critical challenge facing law enforcement agencies. Estimates suggest that the 




Cybercrimes‘ newness has also presented challenges to the court system. For small cybercrime cases, it is diffi-
cult to find an attorney. Experts also say that explaining cybercrimes to judges is difficult. 
 
Another point to bear in mind is increasingly transnational and international nature of cybercrimes, which 
benefit from jurisdictional arbitrage. Organized cybercrimes are initiated from countries with few or no laws 
and little enforcement capacity. For instance, the U.S. couldn‘t prosecute the Philippino hacker, who launched 
the ―Love Letter‖ virus in 2000 because the Philippines had no laws prohibiting cybercrimes that time. Due to 
newness, jurisdictional arbitrage is higher for cybercrimes compared to conventional crimes. 
 
Additional externality effects concern national boundaries. Collaborations and cooperation among law 
enforcement agencies in different jurisdictions are insufficient. For example, Russia and the U.S. have signed 
agreements in many crimes, but not in cybercrimes. Experts also argue countries such as China and Russia 
ignore cybercrimes unless such crimes jeopardize their national interests. 
 
A lack of industry-government collaboration has also hampered law enforcement agencies‘ ability to solve 
cybercrimes. For instance, estimates suggest that 80% of global email traffic including most spams come via 
Web mail services of global providers such as AOL, MSN and Yahoo. Law enforcement agencies have 
expressed concern over these providers‘ unwillingness to cooperate. 
 
Proportionally less cybercrimes than conventional crimes are reported. Some estimates suggest that less than 
10% of cybercrimes are reported to authorities. Most businesses don‘t report cybercrimes because they are 
embarrassed; think doing so would undermine their credibility, likely lead to bad public relations and damage 
reputation; and fear their stock prices would drop. Especially financial institutions and businesses dealing with 
sensitive data such as e-commerce companies are reluctant to turn over the investigation to authorities. 
Complications related to documentation and proofs further discourage reporting cybercrimes. 
 
Diffusion of Cyber Crime Know-How and Technology 
How do cybercrime know-how and technology diffuse? What factors lead to increased width and depth of 
cybercrime adoption among criminals? Diffusion of cybercrimes can be explained in terms of relative 




Cybercrimes‘ principal source of relative advantage stems from the fact that such crimes are less likely to be 
caught and prosecuted. An estimate of PricewaterhouseCoopers indicated that only about 5% of cyber-criminals 
are caught. Moreover, cybercrimes can be committed without leaving home. This is contrary to most 
conventional crimes, for which criminals leave a known territory only for sufficient incentives. 
 
Next, consider compatibility. The Internet has facilitated carrying out of most traditional crimes. The Internet 
has thus become most criminals‘ tool. 
 
The natures of the technology and of hacking communities and organized crime groups have greatly reduced the 
complexity of cybercrime know-how and technology. Most hacking tools are widely available online and 
require little or no expertise. Less skillful criminals also get help from experienced hackers. 
 
Information sharing in the cybercriminal community also reduces the complexity. Members in the community 
help fellow hackers accessing a router and getting through a firewall. Moreover, in some countries, specialized 
schools teach hacking skills. There are also reports that U.S.-based low-end criminals get cybercrime-related 
helps from Russian and Eastern European professional criminals. 
 
Cybercrimes also induce a perception of a high degree of observability for criminals as they are easy to commit 
and rewards are high. Some criminals in the conventional world are cashing in on the trend of increased 
sophistication in cybercrime technologies. For instance, Russian hack rings are reportedly operated by mafia 
and former KGB agents. 
 
Online availability of hacking tools offers risk-free trial to would be hackers. Recently, quantity and availability 
of hacking tools have increased, and the quality has improved. Some sources of externalities thus exist in the 
technology. Evidence also indicates that many college students pirate software and gain illegal access to a 
computer system to browse and/or exchange information. Such experiences provide ‗trial-ability‘ and help them 
get their foot in the door of the cybercrime world. 
 
Increased Predisposition Toward Cybercrime 
What factors contribute to an individual‘s willingness to commit cybercrimes? First, crime rates are linked to 
economic opportunities. Gary Becker3 comments on crimes committed by teenagers: ―[L]ow earnings are a fac-
tor behind crime, and teenagers have lower earnings and fewer opportunities.‖ According to a March 2007 
McAfee Virtual Criminology Report produced with the U.S. and European high-tech crime units, 88% of 
computer science students at a U.S. university admitted committing an illegal act online. A McAfee analyst 
noted that Crime gangs are recruiting and training teenagers as young as 14 for cybercrimes. 
 
In some economies, the lack of employment opportunities has led to increase in cybercrimes. In Russia and 
Eastern Europe, students good in mathematics, physics, and computer science are having difficulty to find jobs. 
Evidence indicates that parents and teachers encourage certain computer crimes such as software piracy thereby 
providing social legitimacy to cybercrimes. Cybercrimes are even more justifiable in some societies. An IDG 
News Service article describes how a Russian hacker-turned-teacher and his friends hacked programs and 
distributed for free: ―It was like our donation to society, it was a form of honor; [we were] like Robin Hood 
bringing programs to people.‖ 
 
Behaviors of ideological hackers interested in political goals can be explained by obligation/community based 
intrinsic motivations. Chinese hackers, for instance, have expressed patriotic and nationalistic longings in cyber-
wars. They have fought cyberwars with Taiwanese, Indonesians, Japanese and U.S. hackers. Chinese hackers 
involved in cyber-wars argued that they were patriotic and didn‘t do anything wrong. Patriotism and national-
ism thus provided cognitive legitimacy of these hackers‘ activities. Other factors energizing ideological hackers 
include motivation to fight against global capitalism and religion. 
 
Technological, behavioral and perceptual weaknesses in defense are tightly linked with cybercrimes. Cyber-
criminals are taking advantage of computer users‘ ignorance. A 2003 Mail-Frontier study indicated that 40% of 
people reading a fraudulent Citibank email believed it to be a real. Similarly, a 2005 survey by America Online 
and the National Cyber Security Alliance found that 80% of the respondents‘ computers were infected by 
spyware and almost all were unaware of it. Another survey found that 56% of U.S. home computers have either 
no or outdated anti-virus software. 
 
At the same time, children‘s online activities aren‘t sufficiently monitored. For instance, many parents don‘t 
know availability of parental controls options at latest versions of operating systems such as Microsoft‘s Vista 
and Apple‘s Mac OS X Tiger. 
 
Some companies negotiate with cyber-criminals by paying ransom. Estimates suggest that online gambling 
companies have paid millions of dollars to cyber-extortionists. Increased success is sending positive cognitive 
messages and making cyber-criminals disrespectful of law enforcement agencies. Many international hackers, 
for instance, don‘t conceal their real identities or mailings‘ origin. 
 
Do cyber-criminals feel guilt after cracking into a computer? Experts argue that most people using computer 
networks unethically don‘t perceive their actions‘ ethical implications. Technologies‘ novelty; a lack of 
previously developed mechanisms, codes, policies, and procedures; and the lack of easily identifiable victims 
lead to less guilt in cybercrimes compared to conventional ones.
9
 It is also argued that standards of rules and 
conducts guiding actions are based on the notion of face-to-face relations. Compared to conventional crimes, 
people involved in cybercrimes are thus less likely to see their actions‘ negative impacts. A final concern 
regards the trend of declining morality. For instance, in the U.S., two-thirds of respondents in a 2004 USA 
Today/CNN/ Gallup Poll said that ―the state of moral values is getting worse.‖
4
 A government-sponsored 
survey in China reported in the early 2007 found similar trend in the country. Rise in cybercrime is associated 
with and facilitated by declining morality. 
 
Conclusion 
Cybercrimes are costing businesses, especially banks and credit-card companies, and consumers billions of 
dollars every year. For instance, in 2006, the cost of identity theft, a significant proportion of which is facilitated 
by the Internet, was estimated at over $50 billion to U.S. businesses plus $5 billion in out-of-pocket expenses. 
We examined synergies between increasing return activities in cybercrimes. Our analysis of economic, 
sociopolitical, and cognitive legitimacy to cyber-criminals, which influence the degree of increasing to returns 
to these criminals, leads to a number of managerial and policy implications. 
 
The battle against cybercrimes must be waged on many fronts. Technological and non-technological measures 
can reduce the externality effects. At micro level, technological and behavioral factors should be considered in 
design and implementation of computer networks to provide negative cognitive feedback to cyber-criminals. 
Technological measures range from disconnecting databases containing sensitive information from the Internet 
to the deployment of sophisticated antifraud technologies such as eBay‘s ‗spoof detector,‘ which enables users 
to receive alerts when eBay/PayPal pass words are entered in inappropriate login screens and some financial 
companies‘ deployment of dummy accounts to trap phishers and tools to detect fake e-commerce/bank Web 
sites. Similarly, behavioral measures such as trainings to enable consumers, employees and the public to 
identify fraudulent email messages may reduce phishing. 
 
Research indicates that time taken to report a crime is among the most important factors affecting the 
probability of arrest. This is especially important for crimes for which preserving evidence is critical for 
successful prosecutions. Preservation of physical and digital evidence is important to successfully prosecute 
cyber-criminals. Timely reporting of cybercrimes to authorities thus sends negative cognitive feedback to 
criminals. 
 
Development of national technological and manpower capabilities; enactment of new laws; a higher level of 
industry-government collaborations; and international coordination may give cyber-criminals negative cognitive 
feedbacks. Given cybercrimes‘ global nature, international institutions especially carry enormous power that 
must be harnessed. 
 
References 
1. Arthur, W.B. Increasing returns and the new world of business. Harvard Bus. Rev. (Jul-Aug. 1996), 101-109. 
2. Banisar, D. Computer hacker‘s sentence spotlights high-tech crime prosecutions. Criminal Justice Weekly, 
(Aug. 3, 1999). 
3. Becker, G. S. The economics of crime. Cross Sections, (Fall 1995), 8-15; http://www.rich.frb.org/pubs/cross/ 
crime/crime.pdf. 
4. Drinkard, J. Nation‘s moral values declining, most say; Poll: Majority see USA as deeply split. USA Today, 
(Nov. 23, 2004), A.11. 
5. Gaviria, A. Increasing returns and the evolution of violent crime: The case of Colombia, Journal of 
Development Economics 61, 1, (2000), 1. 
6. Kshetri, N. The simple economics of cybercrimes. IEEE Security and Privacy 4, 1 (2006), 33-39. 
7. Noda, T. and Collis, D.J. The evolution of intraindustry firm heterogeneity: Insights from a process study, 
Academy of Management Journal 44, 4 (2001), 897- 925. 
8. North, D. C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, U.K., 1990. 
9. Phukan, S. IT ethics in the Internet age: New dimensions, InSITE, June (2002); http://proceedings. 
informingscience.org/IS2002Proceedings/papers/ phuka037iteth.pdf. 
10 .Rogers, E.M. Diffusion of Innovation, 4th edn. Free Press: NY, 1995. 
11. Sah, R. Social osmosis and patterns of crime. Journal of Political Economy 99, 6 (1991), 169–217. 
12. Scott, R. Institutions and Organizations, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2001. 
